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COMMENTS
BOND FOR DEED CONTRACTS
Louisiana attorneys, over the past several decades, have fre-
quently employed the contractual device known as the "bond
for deed" in preparing transactions which ultimately result in
the sale of an immovable. This device is defined by statute as fol-
lows: "A bond for deed is a contract to sell real property, in
which the purchase price is to be paid by the buyer to the seller
in installments and in which the seller after payment of a stipu-
lated sum agrees to deliver title to the buyer."' This definition
contains three key ideas. Unlike the completed sale, which is
usually accompanied by a conventional mortgage and the pay-
ment of installments to be applied to the purchase price, the
bond for deed is a "contract to sell." The meaning of this phrase
will be discussed in detail later. Secondly, the seller retains title,
or ownership, until a stipulated sum is paid, at which time the
seller delivers title to the buyer. Finally, only "real immovable
property" can be the object of this type contract. This Comment
attempts to show that the conventional employment of the bond
for deed often does not conform to its statutory definition. In
effect, the contract that is being employed is no more than a
conditional sale, which has been condemned consistently but,
perhaps, unjustifiably by the jurisprudence. 2 At the outset, how-
ever, a general discussion of the bond for deed and the regula-
tion of its use is appropriate.
Bond for Deed Contracts-General Provisions
Because ownership of the immovable does not pass under a
bond for deed until a stipulated amount of the purchase price is
paid, this contract serves as a particularly useful security device
for the seller. Of necessity, legislation was enacted to protect the
purchaser,3 since purchasers are generally not as well informed as
sellers nor as qualified to protect themselves against sharp
1. LA. R.S. 9:2941 (1950).
2. Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Sinclair, 220 La. 226, 56 So.2d 240 (1951);
Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 174 La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1931);
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193
(1908); Givens v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 197 So.2d 380 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1967); Remington Rand v. Boliew, 131 So.2d 835 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961).
3. LA. R.S. 9:2941 (1950).
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practices.4 For example, the prospective seller 5 must give notice
to the prospective buyer forty-five days prior to an action to
cancel the contract for default on one of the installments.6 It has
been held that this forty-five day notice is mandatory.7 However,
if a mutual agreement to cancel the contract has been made, the
seller may not thereafter maintain that the contract is still in
force because the mandatory forty-five day notice had not been
given, as this legislation was enacted primarily to protect the
buyer.8 Finally, although the legislation's purpose was to protect
the buyer and the notice is mandatory, there is at least one
jurisprudential indication that the buyer may tacitly waive the
mandatory notice requirement.9
Another safeguard for the purchaser is the provision that
the vendor may not sell, by bond for deed, immovable property
encumbered by a mortgage or privilege without first obtaining
from the mortgage or privilege holder(s) a written guarantee
to release the property upon payment by the buyer of a stipu-
lated mortgage release price.'0 The clear purpose of this statute
4. Smith, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957
Term-Particular contracts, 18 LA. L. Rav. 43, 46 (1957).
5. He is only a "prospective" seller because he has not yet conveyed
the ownership of the property. The same is true for the prospective buyer,
who has not yet acquired ownership.
6. LA. R.S. 9:2945 (1950), which reads in part: "If the buyer under a
bond for deed contract shall fail to make the payments in accordance with
its terms and conditions, the seller, at his option, may have the bond for
deed cancelled by proper registry in the conveyance records, provided he
has first caused the escrow agent to serve notice upon the buyer, by regis-
tered mail at his last known address, that unless payment is made as pro-
vided in the bond for deed, within forty-five days from the mailing date of
the notice, the bond for deed shall be cancelled. Where there is no mortgage
or privilege existing upon the property, and the buyer shall be in default,
the seller shall exercise the right of cancellation in the same manner ...."
7. Williams v. Dixie Land Co., 231 La. 834, 93 So.2d 185 (1956); Leinhardt
v. Marrero Land & Improvement Ass'n, 137 So.2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
8. Farthing v. Neely, 129 So.2d 224 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), opinion on
rehearing.
9. See Hymel v. Old Homestead, Inc., 135 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961), where the purchaser maintained that even though he had not paid an
installment for twenty-five years, sellers had never put him in default. The
court said that the purchaser, by not paying an installment for twenty-five
years, had abandoned the contract and the sellers were entitled to consider
it as such. It seems the court was either overlooking the fact that the forty-
five day notice, or putting in default, is mandatory, or was intimating that
there had been an implied mutual rescission of the contract.
10. LA. R.S. 9:2942 (1950) provides: "It shall be unlawful to sell by bond
for deed contract, any real property which is encumbered by mortgage or
privilege without first obtaining a written guarantee from the mortgage or
privilege holders to release the property upon payment by the buyer of a
stipulated mortgage release price, with which agreement the secured notes
shall be identified. The agreement shall be recorded in the mortgage records
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is to safeguard a vendee of mortgaged property from fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation, thus insuring him an unencumbered
title." However, only substantial compliance with this statute
is necessary. For example, a buyer who has agreed to pay the
seller and the mortgagee jointly, applying the payments to the
mortgage, is estopped from asserting the absolute nullity of his
contract on grounds that the seller had not obtained the written
guarantee from the bank to release the property upon payment
of the mortgage release price. 2 In any event, a seller may suffer
criminal penalties by failing to comply substantially with this
provision.'"
In addition to this specific legislation, the courts have played
an independent and important role in regulating the bond for
deed. Litigation has resulted, for instance, from forfeiture clauses
which, if enforced, would enable a seller to retain all the install-
ments previously made as "liquidated damages." The usual text
of such a clause is as follows: "Upon payment of all the install-
ments, seller agrees to deliver a warranty deed to buyer. How-
ever, upon default in any installment, seller has the option, after
giving the requisite notice, to cancel this contract and retain all
previously paid installments as liquidated damages.' 4 Unfortu-
nately, no statutes governing the bond for deed contract mention
the measure of damages to which a prospective vendor is entitled
upon cancellation for non-payment of the price. 5 Nevertheless,
the courts have generally been adamant in their condemnation
of the parish where the property is situated before any part of the property
is offered for sale under bond for deed contracts. The provisions of this
Part likewise shall apply to any property offered for sale by bond for deed
contract which may be subsequently mortgaged or encumbered by a
privilege."
11. Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113 So.2d 457 (1959).
12. Id.
13. LA. R.S. 9:2947 (1950) provides: "Any person who sells by bond for
deed contract any real property encumbered by mortgage or privilege with-
out first obtaining and recording the guarantee required by R.S. 9:2942,
shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not
more than six months, or both.
"Any seller in a bond for deed contract of property encumbered with
a mortgage or privilege, who requires promissory notes to represent the
purchase price or any portion thereof, shall be fined not more than one thou-
sand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both."
14. See, e.g., Louisiana Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So.2d
213 (1942); Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936); Heeb v. Codifer
& Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926); Chauvin v. Theriot, 180
So. 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938); Victor v. Lewis, 157 So. 293 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1934); Subdivision Realty Co. v. Woulfe, 135 So. 71 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1931).
15. See LA. R.S. 9:2941-47 (1950). See also Comment, 33 TUL. I Rsv. 180,
194-95 (1958).
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of forfeiture clauses, declaring them, without further explanation,
to be void ab initio as unreasonable, arbitrary, and therefore
against public policy.' A few decisions have not pronounced the
forfeiture clause void ab initio, but have required that the
amount of payments forfeited bear some reasonable relation to
the fair rental value of the property for the time the prospective
purchaser occupied the premises.17 At least one court has indi-
cated that such a clause could be a valid penal clause within the
purview of Louisiana Civil Code article 1934(5).18
It is submitted that the first approach listed above, that such
a clause is void ab initio, is the correct one. From the seller's
viewpoint, the object of a bond for deed contract is payment of
money. According to the Civil Code a creditor is entitled only to
interest as damages due for the delay in the performance of an
obligation to pay money.19 This approach has been followed in
several decisions 20 and appears to be in accordance with the
meaning of the appropriate Civil Code articles.21 Since forfeiture
clauses entitle the vendor to much more than interest on the sum
due, they should be void ab initio. Moreover, it is submitted that
forfeiture clauses should be void ab initio even when the amount
to be forfeited approximately equals the amount which would
have to be paid as interest. The intention behind the forfeiture
clause is not to approximate the interest which might be due but
to penalize the purchaser. In other words, these clauses are ac-
tually indicative of stipulated or "agreed upon" damages, which
are unrelated, except by coincidence, to interest on the sum due.
The only damages to which the prospective seller is entitled in
bond for deed contracts for nonpayment of the price are in-
terest .
22
16. Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113 So.2d 457 (1959); Ekman v. Vallery,
185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936); Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La.
139, 110 So. 178 (1926); Farthing v. Neely, 129 So.2d 224 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961); Subdivision Realty Co. v. Woulfe, 135 So. 71 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931).
17. Louisiana Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So.2d 213 (1942);
Pruyn v. Gay, 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925).
18. Cointment v. Segrest, 184 So. 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1935 reads: "The damages due for delay In the
performance of an obligation to pay money are called Interest. The creditor
is entitled to those damages without proving any loss, and whatever loss
he may have suffered he can recover no more."
20. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926);
Chauvin v. Therlot, 180 So. 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938); Claude Neon Fed.
Co. v. Angell, 153 So. 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
21. LA. CIV. CovR arts. 1935-38, 1944.
22. Id. art. 1935.
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Although damages for nonpayment of money are interest on
the sum due, when the prospective seller sues to cancel the bond
for deed contract, rather than to collect the price, it would be
inequitable to refuse him compensation for the period of time
during which the prospective purchaser has occupied the prem-
ises. The legal status of the prospective purchaser is important
here, since this status is helpful in properly computing damages.
One court has compared the prospective purchaser to a tenant or
lessee, subject to being ejected like the tenant who has breached
his lease or whose lease has expired. 28 Another court has likened
the prospective purchaser to a bona fide possessor of land.24
Actually, the prospective purchaser fits neatly into neither cate-
gory. Unlike the lessee, he looks forward to ownership of the
property; unlike the bona fide possessor, he does not possess as
owner. Although the prospective purchaser is not a lessee, it
is submitted that this is the most appropriate legal status for
purposes of categorizing him. Except for events which may, or
may not, take place in the future, the position held by the
prospective purchaser is very similar to the position held by the
lessee in that he is neither an owner nor one who possesses as
owner. Therefore, unlike a bona fide possessor, a prospective
purchaser should not be entitled to the fruits and revenues of
the land, although one court has indicated that he is.2 5 In any
event, upon cancellation of the contract by the seller because of
default in payment by the buyer, the courts have consistently
held that the seller is entitled to the fair rental value for the
period during which the purchaser has occupied the premises,26
plus any actual loss beyond reasonable wear and tear occasioned
by the buyer's occupancy.27 The buyer, when the seller cancels,
is entitled to a return of the installment, insurance premiums,
taxes which he had contractually agreed to pay,28 and the cost
23. Brown v. Weldon, 199 So. 620 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
24. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926).
25. Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359 (1940), where
the court held that a prospective purchaser was entitled to damages when
the prospective seller executed a mineral lease on the property before the
time that the act of sale was to be passed. But see Note, 2 LA. L. Ptsv. 749
(1940), where the author criticizes the theoretical basis upon which the
Bandel court allowed damages.
26. Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113 So.2d 457 (1959); Pruyn v. Gay, 159
La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925); Farthing v. Neely, 129 So.2d 224 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961).
27. Farthing v. Neely, 129 So.2d 224 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
28. Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So. 521 (1936).
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of any improvements placed on the property with the seller's
express or implied consent.2 9
When the seller breaches the contract by refusing to pass
the act of sale to which the purchaser is entitled after paying the
requisite amount of installments, the buyer is entitled to specific
performance and damages.30 If the seller has previously sold
the property to a third party, the prospective purchaser can
recover from the seller the reasonable value of the property less
an amount representing the balance due on the purchase price.81
It would also appear that if the prospective purchaser's bond for
deed contract were recorded before the sale to the third party,
he could prevail against the third party purchaser by bringing a
possessory action, if in possession, or a petitory action, if out of
possession, once the required number of installments were paid. 2
As to the appropriate prescriptive period for an action to
cancel the bond for deed contract for nonpayment of the price,
the jurisprudence is inconsistent and confusing. It is well settled
that an action to cancel a sale for nonpayment of the price is
prescribed by the ten year period running against personal actions
found in Louisiana Civil Code article 3544.83 This prescriptive
29. Id.; Heeb v. Codifer & I3onnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926).
In Heeb the court stated the prospective purchaser is entitled to the im-
provements within the purview of Civil Code article 508 whereby a bona
fide purchaser is entitled to reimbursement from the true owner. It appears
that such reasoning is conceptually erroneous since the prospective pur-
chaser does not possess the property as owner. It seems more correct to
allow reimbursement in such a case on the theory that to do otherwise
would result in an unjust enrichment to the seller. Thus the seller should
compensate for the improvements.
30. Bandel v. Sabine Lumber Co., 194 La. 31, 193 So. 359 (1940). See
also Note, 2 LA. L. REV. 749 (1940).
31. Dozier & Williams v. Dixie Land Co., 231 La. 834, 93 So.2d 185 (1956).
32. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3651, 3655-56. Assuming the prospective
purchaser is not in possession, he must wait until he has paid the required
number of installments before he can bring the petitory action. This is be-
cause he is not yet owner, or entitled to ownership, until the stipulated
amount of installments is paid.
If the prospective purchaser is in possession, there is certainly doubt
as to whether he is entitled to bring the possessory action before he obtains
the ownership by paying the installments. If he is treated as a lessee, then
he is clearly not entitled to the benefit of a possessory action under the
provisions of LA. CODE CIV. P. 3656, since he does not possess for himself. On
the other hand, if he is treated as a bona fide possessor, then he is entitled
to use the possessory action. It is submitted that for purposes of uniformity,
the courts should follow the analogy to the lessee, although admittedly the
analogy is imperfect in one major respect. The prospective purchaser is
looking forward to ultimate ownership, whereas the lessee is not.
33. See Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 17 So.2d 264
(1944); Louisiana Truck & Orange Land Co. v. Page, 199 La. 1, 5 So.2d 365
(1941).
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period is applicable even when the action may result in the
recovery of immovable property,84 since this action is considered
personal. 85 However, the supreme court, without discussion, has
indicated that the action to cancel a bond for deed contract for
nonpayment of the price is not governed by the ten year prescrip-
tion. The court distinguished bond for deed contracts on the
basis that these are contracts to sell, and not contracts of sale.86
Prior to that decision, an appellate court had indicated that the
ten-year prescriptive period was applicable. However, in this
latter case the appellate court held that the prospective purchaser
would not benefit by such a plea, since he had no title and was in
possession only by virtue of the very contract which he was
claiming had prescribed.sT In other words, since defendant's
rights in the property rested solely on the contract, he would be
obliterating those rights by claiming the contract had prescribed.
Both of these positions appear untenable. The contract to
sell is obviously a contract, and it is not specifically provided
for in any of the other prescription articles. Using the identical
reasoning which the courts have so consistently employed for the
contract of sale, the action to enforce the resolutory condition for
nonpayment of the purchase price is a personal action prescribed
in ten years under Civil Code article 3544.38 Also, the prospective
purchaser should not defeat his purposes by making such a plea.
The purchaser is not claiming that all the actions under the
contract have prescribed. He is only claiming that one action
under the contract has prescribed-the action to enforce the
resolutory condition for nonpayment of price. Indeed, "the action
to enforce the resolutory condition is an action to enforce a part
... of a contract. It is not an action to annul or to rescind a con-
tract, which may be based only on some vice existing ab initio
in the contract."89
34. Normally actions to recover immovable property are denominated
as real actions and are prescribed by the thirty-year liberative prescription
under LA. CIv. CODE art. 3548.
35. Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 17 So.2d 264 (1944).
36. Louisiana Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So.2d 213 (1942).
37. Southwestern Improvement Co. v. Whittington, 193 So. 483 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1940).
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3544 reads: "In general, all personal actions, except
those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years."
39. R. E. E. DeMontluzin Co. v. New Orleans & N. E. R.R., 166 La. 822,
828, 118 So. 33, 35 (1928). In short, the prospective purchaser has much to
gain by the plea of prescription running against the prospective vendor's
action to enforce the resolutory condition for nonpayment. If the vendor
can find no other way to cancel, the prospective purchaser can sue for
specific performance.
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The Bond for Deed and Conditional Sales
As intimated earlier, the everyday use of the bond for deed
contract does not conform to its statutory definition of a "contract
to sell."40 On the contrary, the purpose of this section is to demon-
strate that the bond for deed contract, as generally utilized by
Louisiana attorneys, is no more than a conditional sale--a legal
conception consistently condemned as "impossible" by the Louisi-
ana jurisprudence since the landmark Barber Asphalt decision
in 1908.41
In order to support authoritatively the above contention, a
necessary first step is to distinguish the true contract to sell from
the conditional sale. The supreme court, in Barber Asphalt Paving
Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co.,42 defined the conditional sale as one
in which ownership of the thing sold is prevented from passing
to the purchaser until the price is paid. In other words, it is a
sale subject to the suspensive condition of the price being paid,
at which time ownership is passed to the purchaser. Thus far, the
definition of a conditional sale is very similar to that of a contract
to sell, which also has been defined as a contract in which owner-
ship does not pass to the purchaser until payment of the price. 4
It is, however, the period between the making of the initial con-
tract and the payment of the price wherein lies the difference.
During the interim period, the purchaser is either entitled or not
entitled to possession of the property. It is submitted that where
the purchaser is entitled to possession of the property, the parties
have usually contemplated that an actual sale has taken place,
subject to the suspensive condition that ownership will not pass
until the price is paid.44 Where the purchaser is not entitled to
immediate possession, a true contract to sell exists whereby the
parties are only looking forward to a contract of sale on some
40. See LA. R.S. 9:2941 (1950).
41. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46
So. 193 (1908).
42. Id.
43. Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., 214 La. 750, 38 So.2d 729 (1948); Peck
v. Bemiss, 10 La. Ann. 159, 162-63 (1885). See also Comments, 4 LA. L. Rsv.
634 (1942), 26 TUL. L. Rov. 498 (1952).
44. See Cruz, The Validity of the Conditional Sale in Civil Law, 4 TUL.
L. REv. 530, 537 (1930), where the author states: "The sale subject to a
suspensive condition supposes that the sale does not exist until the con-
dition occurs, and in the conditional sale the effects of a sale are obtained
without the condition of the payment of the price having been fulfilled by
the vendee; nevertheless, he obtains the possession and use of the thing sold
as soon as he enters the contract and only leaves the acquisition of the title
subject to the condition." (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 31
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specified date in the future. For example, suppose the parties
executed the following agreement:
"I, Seller, agree to sell my house to buyer for $20,000 two
weeks from date of this agreement.
"I, Buyer, agree to buy Seller's house for $20,000 two weeks
from date."
At the time of this agreement, it is clear that ownership did
not pass. On the contrary, the parties intended to execute a writ-
ten contract of sale two weeks from date. Since the parties did
not intend a sale at the time of the initial agreement, the pur-
chaser has no right to possession during the interim period.
An example of the conditional sale is as follows:
"I, Seller, hereby sell my house to Buyer for $20,000, subject
to the condition that ownership shall not pass to Buyer until
the price is paid.
"I, Buyer, accept Seller's offer and condition stated."
In this case the parties intended to make a sale. Since a usual
concomitant of any sale is the transfer of possession, the pur-
chaser is entitled to possession of the above house. The purchaser
is not yet entitled to the ownership, since this part of the sale is
subject to the suspensive condition of paying the price.
Commentators in other jurisdictions have noted the distinc-
tion between the two types of real estate conveyances, the
contract to sell being denominated as a mere marketing device
and the conditional sale as the true security device. In Iowa, a
commentator stated:
"The Iowa law governing contracts for the sale of land
encompasses two distinct types of conveyancing instruments.
A "marketing" or "binder" contract ordinarily provides for
payment of the full purchase price and delivery of a deed
within a relatively short time. This type of contract is thus
used to implement an immediate transfer of all the vendor's
interest in the land, and the vendor usually remains in
possession until the transaction has been completed. The
installment contract, on the other hand, is a long term
conveyancing device designed to give the purchaser immedi-
ate possession and enjoyment of the land while extending his
payment of the purchase price over a period of years. . ...,45
45. Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 786 (1961).
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Similarly, a California commentator concluded that two primary
land conveyancing devices exist. The marketing instrument, or
contract to sell, is characterized by deposit receipts, earnest
money, or mutual escrow instructions. This is not intended to
be an agreement whereby title is reserved as security. The
second device is the installment land contract or contract for
deed-an "agreement under which the seller retains title pri-
marily as security for the price as opposed to the initial phase
of an otherwise financed purchase."46
As previously mentioned, the bond for deed contract is
defined by statute as a contract to sell. The purchaser should thus
not be entitled to possession of the property. Yet in every Lou-
isiana decision this writer has read on the subject, the parties
ostensibly executing a bond for deed actually intended to make a
conditional sale, a sale inherently accompanied with the security
device of retention of ownership until the price is paid. Further-
more, there was never an issue pertaining to the purchaser's right
to immediate possession. In short, the conditional sale has been
persistently utilized in Louisiana to convey immovable property
under the guise of bond for deed contracts.
Astute counsel in at least two Louisiana decisions have
recognized that the bond for deed in their cases were not con-
tracts to sell but actually conditional sales. In St. Landry Loan
Co., Inc. v. Etienne47 counsel contended the bond for deed contract
under review was actually a conditional sale, a transfer unknown
to the law of Louisiana. The court agreed that conditional sales
are unknown in Louisiana with respect to movables, but submit-
ted that they are permissible with regard to immovables. The
reason for allowing the latter, according to that court, was that a
sale of immovable property, unlike movable property, is not
complete until there is "a deed translative of title, since verbal
sales or parol evidence cannot in Louisiana prove title to realty."
In accord is an earlier supreme court decision, Trichel v. Home
Insurance Co.,48 in which the court elucidated: "But with real
estate the case is different; neither consent, nor delivery, nor
payment of the price suffice to transfer the ownership; there
46. Hetland, The California Land Contract, 48 CALF. L. REV. 729 n.2(1960). See also Note, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 453 (1962), where throughout the
article the author refers to the land installment contract (bond for deed)
as a conditional sale.
47. St. Landry Loan Co. v. Etienne, 227 So.2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
48. Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 155 La. 459, 99 So. 403 (1924).
[Vol. 31
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must be a deed translative of the title.' '49 Following this theory,
since ownership of immovable property does not pass until
execution of a deed translative of title, the parties are free to
stipulate as to the moment they will execute such a deed and thus
pass ownership.
It is submitted that the reason presented for differentiating
immovables from movables is devoid of merit5 ° under both the
Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana jurisprudence, other
than those decisions cited above. In the first place, Civil Code
article 2440 provides, in part, that a sale of an immovable may be
made and consummated under a private writing.51 When not con-
fronted with a bond for deed, the courts have often recognized
this principle and have held that a deed translative of title is not
required to pass ownership. 52 Furthermore, Civil Code article 2275
provides that even verbal sales are capable of passing the owner-
ship of immovable property provided certain conditions are met.53
Since a deed translative of title is not required for the sale of
movables or immovables, its presence or absence should not
serve as a basis for distinguishing the application of the prohi-
bition against conditional sales.
Having concluded that the bond for deed contract, as used
in practice, is no more than a conditional sale, having demon-
strated that our jurisprudence has presented no sound justification
49. Id. at 462, 99 So. at 404.
50. Other writers have also questioned the distinction between movable
and immovable property. See Cruz, The Validity of the Conditional Sale in
Civil Law, 4 TUL. L. REV. 530, 573 (1930); Comment, 33 TUL. L. REv. 180, 195
n.114 (1958).
51. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2440 reads: "All sales of Immovable property shall
be made by authentic act or under private signatures.
"Except as provided in article 2275, every verbal sale of Immovables
shall be null, as well for third persons as for the contracting parties them-
selves, and the testimonial proof of it shall not be admitted."
52. LeBlanc v. Watson, 13 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1926), where the court
in discussing Trichel and Pruyn held: "A deed is merely the evidence of
ownership, and we do not understand that the Supreme Court of Louisiana
meant to say that, where property has been bought and paid for under a
binding contract, nothing short of a deed will make the purchaser owner."
Accord, Kinchen v. Redmond, 156 La. 418, 100 So. 607 (1924); Teal v. Mc-
Knight, 110 La. 256, 24 So. 434 (1903). See also Noto v. Blasco, 198 So. 429
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1940), which indicates the same.
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2275 reads: "Every transfer of immovable property
must be in writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such prop-
erty be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as against the
vendee, who confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided actual de-
livery has been made of the immovable property thus sold." See also Larido
v. Perkins, 132 La. 660, 61 So. 728 (1913), where the court deals with a verbal
sale of an immovable and admits its validity if the conditions of Civil Code
article 2275 are met.
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for distinguishing movables and immovables in this context,
two conclusions could logically follow. Either the courts have
unjustifiably permitted conditional sales of immovables or have
unjustifiably denied conditional sales of movables. It is suggested
that the latter conclusion is the correct one, primarily because
there is no legal basis for not recognizing conditional sales of
movables. As alluded to earlier, Barber Asphalt5 4 was the first
decision to pronounce the conditional sale of a movable as
"impossible" under the Civil Code. In that case a seller claimed
the ownership of a steam shovel, alleging that he had sold same
to buyer with the stipulation that ownership of the property
would remain in the petitioner until final payment. Stripped of
unnecessary verbiage, the agreement was structured similar to
the following:
"Seller agrees to deliver possession of the steamshovel to
Buyer; however, title shall not pass until the full purchase
price is paid."
The court stated that the seller's purpose was obvious-by
retaining ownership he was better able to secure payment of the
price. However, the court held that ownership of the steamshovel
had passed at the moment of the agreement, not upon payment
of the price, because where there is consent as to object and
price the sale immediately follows whether or not the parties
intend otherwise. 55
The most potent argument against such a position is a mere
recitation of the first paragraph of Civil Code article 2471: "A
sale, made with a suspensive condition, does not transfer the
property to the buyer, until the fulfillment of the condition ... "
The import of this article is clear-there may be consent as to the
object and price, and the parties are still free to agree that the
ownership shall not be transferred until a certain suspensive
54. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46
So. 193 (1908).
55. The court based this argument on the provisions of LA. CIv. CODE art.
2456: "The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties, and the
property is of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as
soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof,
although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid." As
article 2456 does not distinguish movables and immovables, the same argu-
ment used by the Barber Asphalt court could be used to direct that an im-
mediate sale of an immovable occurs under the same circumstances. It is
this writer's position that article 2456 does not require the passing of im-
mediate ownership in connection with the sale of either type of property, if
the parties clearly intended otherwise.
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condition is fulfilled. The parties are free to determine all
"accidental" elements according to their convenience,56 and a
stipulation to the effect that ownership will not be transferred
until the price is paid is such an element. Of course, the ultimate
transfer of ownership is an essential element of any sale; but
the time at which the ownership will pass is not.
Other arguments by the Barber Asphalt court against condi-
tional sales were advanced. First, the court stated that "there
cannot be a price until there is a sale .... It is the sale which
creates the price; the existence of the sale is a condition prece-
dent to there being a price."57 Second, the court disliked the fact
that the buyer was unconditionally bound to pay the price, but the
seller was not bound to do anything until the price was paid.
It appears that each of these arguments is unsound. As to the
court's conclusion that there cannot be a price until there is a
sale-that it is the sale which creates the price-it is clear that
the reverse of this statement is true. Civil Code article 2439 states,
in essence, that the price is one of the things which perfects the
sale,8 and not vice-versa. As to the argument that the seller,
56. see LA. Civ. COD art. 1764, which provides: "All things that are not
forbidden by law, may legally become the subject of, or the motive for con-
tracts; but different agreements are governed by different rules, adapted to
the nature of each contract, to distinguish which it is necessary in every
contract to consider:
"1. That which is the essence of the contract, for the want whereof
there is either no contract at all, or a contract of another description. Thus
a price is essential to the contract of sale; if there be none, it is either no
contract, or if the consideration be other property, it is an exchange.
"2. Things which, although not essential to the contract, yet are implied
from the nature of such an agreement, if no stipulation be made respecting
them, but which the parties may expressly modify or renounce, without
destroying the contract or changing its description; of this nature is war-
ranty, which is implied in every sale, but which may be modified or re-
nounced, without changing the character of the contract or destroying its
effect.
"3. Accidental stipulations, which belong neither to the essence nor the
nature of the contract, but depend solely on the will of the parties. The
term given for the payment of a loan, the place at which it is to be
paid, and the nature of the rent payable on a lease, are examples of acci-
dental stipulations.
"What belongs to the essence and to the nature of each particular de-
scription of contract, is determined by the law defining such contracts;
accidental stipulations depend on the will of the parties, regulated by the
general rules applying to all contracts." See also Cruz, The Validity of the
Conditional Sale in Civl Law, 4 Tun. L. Rsv. 530, 573 (1930).
57. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 166,
46 So. 193, 198 (1908).
58. LA. CIV. CoDE art. 2439 provides: "The contract of sale is an agree-
ment by which one gives a thing for a price in current money, and the
other gives the price in order to have the thing itself.
"Three circumstances concur to the perfection of the contract, to wit:
the thing sold, the price and the consent."
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unlike the buyer, would not be bound to do anything until the
price is paid, it seems that the seller is bound before he passes
the ownership to the buyer. Of course, no examples appear in the
jurisprudence where the court held the seller of a movable in a
conditional sale bound before ownership was passed to the buyer,
since the courts have condemned such sales before this secondary
issue could arise. However, having concluded that, as used in
practice, the bond for deed contract is merely a conditional sale,
authority for the proposition that a seller is bound even before
title is passed may be found by studying this contract. An appel-
late court held the seller must retain title to the property so that
he can pass it to the buyer upon payment of the price. 9 Like-
wise, the supreme court held a vendor under a bond for deed
liable when he sold the property to a third person prior to the
time he was to have passed the ownership to the purchaser.60
Conclusion
At the outset of this Comment it was stated the bond for
deed contract has enjoyed frequent use by Louisiana attorneys
over the past several decades. In retrospect, this writer concludes
this statement must be qualified since the true bond for deed is
statutorily defined as a contract to sell, and the bond for deed
actually employed is merely a conditional sale. The judiciary
has generally overlooked this fact, or, when confronted with
the issue that the transaction was a conditional sale, responded
by distinguishing conditional sales of movables and immovables.
Hopefully it has been demonstrated that there is no foundation
for such a distinction. Therefore, either the conditional sales
of both movables and immovables should be condemned or
upheld. It is submitted the latter solution is the preferable one
since it was incorrect to outlaw the conditional sales of movables
in the first place. Hence it is urged that the judiciary uphold
conditional sales of both movables and immovables, not only
for theoretical correctness, but for the very practical purpose
of uniformity.
David Levingston
59. Middleton v. Natal, 121 So. 681 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
60. Williams v. Dixie Land Co., 231 La. 834, 93 So.2d 185 (1956).
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